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BY WHAT STRANGE CHANNELS: 
NICHOLAS MOSLEY’S LITERARY  
CIRCUITS
Abram Foley 
In May of 1988, nine years after his novel Catastrophe Practice was first 
published in England, British author Nicholas Mosley wrote a letter to 
John O’Brien, founder of Dalkey Archive Press and editor of the Review 
of Contemporary Fiction. By 1988, Dalkey Archive Press had published 
two of Mosley’s books in the United States and was now preparing to 
publish Catastrophe Practice. Mosley’s letter to O’Brien is a “brief progress 
report” to the American publisher, in which Mosley takes a moment to 
describe the results of an “intensive spell” he had just spent revising his 
book: “the whole thing has more internal liveliness and consistency, and 
thus, with luck, might after all hit the outside world with more impact.”1 
After an interlude of nine years—and the publication of three more 
books in what became his Catastrophe Practice series—Mosley’s return 
to Catastrophe Practice derives from two sources: his desire to rework 
the aesthetic text and from the more external impetus of a forthcoming 
American edition of the book. To these ends, Mosley’s processes of revi-
sion bring together complementary aspects of literature: the aesthetic 
economy of texts and the material processes of literary production, dis-
tribution, and reception. In short, Mosley’s letter suggests how the text’s 
“internal liveliness” is affected by and tests the literary practices by which 
it travels. By what strange channels, Mosley later asks, do his texts find 
their way in the world? And in what form do such channels return his 
work to him? With scrupulous attentiveness to these questions, Mosley’s 
work considers the conceptual and material matters of literature, mat-
ters of both medium and message, that constitute the complementarity of 
 literature and  literary production.2
When Mosley returned to Catastrophe Practice in 1988, his revisions 
stemmed as much from the book’s unique position in his body of work as 
from any inconsistency in its conception. Catastrophe Practice is the first 
book of the five-book Catastrophe Practice series, which concludes with 
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the award-winning Hopeful Monsters, first published in 1990.3 At the time 
of his letter to O’Brien, Mosley had recently completed Hopeful Monsters, 
and in April of 1988 Mosley told O’Brien that he thought “this last book—
Hopeful Monsters—will make the scheme of the whole if not exactly clear, 
at least there to be found with enthusiasm by anyone who cares to look.”4 
The exigency for Mosley’s return to Catastrophe Practice thus issues from 
the circularity built into Mosley’s serial form. While Catastrophe Practice 
was the first book in the series to be published, the narrative events within 
Catastrophe Practice take place last. Analogously, the events in Hopeful 
Monsters precede the events in the other four books, even though Hopeful 
Monsters concludes the series. The Catastrophe Practice series inter-
changes beginnings and ends, perplexing seriality and calling to mind the 
“commodius vicus of recirculation”5 with which James Joyce describes the 
circular structure Finnegans Wake. In a similarly circular gesture, Mosley 
revisits the inaugural book of the series only once he has written the sub-
sequent four books. His return to the original book commences another 
beginning, but a beginning made possible through the sequences and 
 consequences of the other books.
Mosley’s return to the origin of the Catastrophe Practice series offers 
a suitably byzantine entry point into a critical interpretation of his work. 
Even if his desire to rework the initial installment of the series follows 
from the recursive methods of literary work in general, Mosley’s careful 
attention to these recursive processes underwrites his particular literary 
project. Mosley develops a method of trial and error, whereby the inde-
terminate text and the wandering textual object ultimately converge to 
produce results. These results, however, must always be prone to revision. 
When Catastrophe Practice returns to Mosley via an interested American 
publisher, Mosley responds to its return as a manifestation of the unpredict-
able ends of literary circulation. This is to say that, as Mosley reworks his 
aesthetic text, he also works through the structures and practices that set 
his text in circulation. Accordingly, Mosley invites his readers to encounter 
his work with an eye as much to the aesthetic economy of his text as to the 
material practices that channel the book-object into the world.
Mosley’s effort to think through the complementary aspects of 
 literary aesthetics and literary practices perplexes Pierre Bourdieu’s 
notion of the literary field, which Bourdieu sees as being constituted 
by processes of aesthetic, material, and symbolic “position- takings.”6 
Bourdieu argues that the position-takings by which literary auton-
omy develops must be underwritten by the pursuit of symbolic capi-
tal, whether the literary artist is conscious of that pursuit or not. 
Authors can afford to reject economic interests and produce art only 
for other producers—a key aspect of Bourdieu’s sphere of restricted 
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production—because such limitations produce the symbolic capital 
with which an artist achieves consecration and even economic success. 
So while the sphere of restricted production is based on “a systematic 
inversion of the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies,” it 
still works by an economy of symbolic capital. Furthermore, although 
Bourdieu argues that the “autonomy of a field of restricted produc-
tion can be measured by its power to define its own criteria for the 
production and evaluation of its products,” he also proposes that this 
“implies translation of all external determinations in conformity with 
its own principles of functioning.”7 According to this argument, a field 
of restricted production can define its own criteria for evaluation and 
production, but those criteria are systematic inversions, or translations, 
of external determinations. Aesthetic autonomy, in short, is a translated 
expression of “external determinations,” where we might translate 
“external” as “economic,” and “determinations” as “determinism.” For 
Bourdieu, literary autonomy operates by way of a market logic, how-
ever inverted it might be. The indeterminacy of aesthetic texts and lit-
erary practices has no place here, where everything is accounted for. 
Mosley’s literary complementarity differs from the constitutive pro-
cesses of Bourdieu’s literary field in that it accepts both the indetermi-
nate economy of aesthetic texts and the indeterminate ends of textual 
objects. Mosley’s work offers a less restricted alternative to Bourdieu’s 
grasp of the processes that constitute the literary field.
With Catastrophe Practice, Mosley initiates his reflections on literary 
processes by showing that even the individual book is multiple, a point 
he tests through the development of the series. Catastrophe Practice, 
which collects three plays, four essays, and a short novel, engages the 
complementarity between the singularity of the book and the multi-
plicity of the text. The book and its paratextual markers limit the text’s 
indeterminacy by giving it distinct form and making the text into an 
identifiable object.8 At the same time, the book circulates in the world 
and broadcasts the text within a literary field. When I refer to the singu-
larity of the book, then, I mean to suggest that the book-object is singu-
lar in that it restrains the text’s indeterminacy. But the singular book is 
also errant. It follows strange channels, some of which are created by the 
very text it carries, and so the ends of the book in circulation must be left 
open to chance. Following this logic, one should resist reading Mosley’s 
return to Catastrophe Practice in the late 1980s as a discrete act of revi-
sion, where Mosley tinkers with a few words to add consistency to the 
whole. Rather, Catastrophe Practice shows us Mosley thinking through 
literature, via its filters and strange channels, as both a regulatory and 
propagative system.
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Although authors, translators, publishers, and reviewers have a vested 
interest in responding to the processes of literary circulation, academic 
interest in literary production and mediation has only recently caught 
up to contemporary literature, particularly in relation to debates about 
world literature.9 However, such debates have often played out in terms 
of translation into and out of English and French, leaving little room for a 
scarcely translated English-language author such as Mosley. Yet Mosley’s 
work illustrates the broader interactions taking place between contem-
porary literary aesthetics and literary practices, even if the critical idiom 
of translation is not immediately at stake. In the following, then, I look 
at the circuitous mediations found within Mosley’s work to propose that 
Mosley develops his aesthetic by means of a critical emphasis on circu-
larity and circulation, which bears the logic not only of a deep literary 
history—Sir Thomas Browne, Laurence Sterne, James Joyce, and Jorge 
Luis Borges—but also of a metaliterary focus on the physical processes 
of literary exchange.10 I propose that Mosley’s reflections on the circula-
tion of the book-object show that his thought is shaped by the logic of 
literary production: he returns to Catastrophe Practice via the feedback 
loops of trial and error that make up the literary field, for the field of 
literature functions more like a circuit, or a system, than an open field. 
It is a field shot through with strange channels, some of which are the 
very books it puts into circulation. With literary scholarship turning more 
toward media theory and the reclamation of materialist approaches to lit-
erature, a present return to the work of Nicholas Mosley reminds us that 
the medium is, indeed, part of the message, even if the message is late on 
arrival. This is to say, it is time that literary scholarship caught up with the 
work of Nicholas Mosley.
Mosley’s Circuitous Mediations
When Mosley introduces the 1991 Dalkey Archive Press reissue of 
Catastrophe Practice, he implies the subtle similarities between his the-
ory of literature and his revisionary practice. In his introduction, Mosley 
observes that “Catastrophe Practice was the first book to be written in the 
series that carries its name. It was a seed for the other books—Imago Bird 
[1980], Serpent [1981], Judith [1986], Hopeful Monsters [1990]. It was to 
be seen as a seed; but a seed is perhaps best looked at after its fruits.”11 
Using horticultural metaphors that he attends to throughout the series, 
Mosley hints at the generative logic of the serial form. Catastrophe Practice 
is the seed for the books that follow, but the seed manifests its potential 
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only through its subsequent generations. To pare Mosley’s metaphor, the 
thought within the initial book is processed through the books that fol-
low it. Through a recursive loop, Catastrophe Practice becomes the first 
and sixth books of the Catastrophe Practice series. It becomes both origin 
and culmination, undermining the terminal logic in both. By threading 
the needle of two such determinate points, Catastrophe Practice emerges 
as the interminable continuation of the book’s unknown future. The 
resultant temporal vertigo gives us every reason to continue returning 
to Mosley’s texts and offers access to Mosley’s circuitous mediations. The 
next three sections of this essay focus on Mosley’s texts and the manner in 
which they attend to mediation, particularly as mediation relates to the 
complementarity between literary aesthetics and literary practices. Only 
after a close consideration of the ideas developed within Mosley’s aes-
thetic texts does the essay return to Mosley’s interest in the errant paths 
of textual objects.
If thinking through Catastrophe Practice results in temporal con-
fusions, it is due in part to Mosley’s refusal to make the book discrete. 
Although designated “a novel” on the cover of its current Dalkey edition, 
Catastrophe Practice incorporates multiple literary forms. In four essays, 
three plays, and a short novel, all of which are interrelated, Catastrophe 
Practice outlines Mosley’s interest in the book as a sort of compendium 
that gathers multiplicity. The plays, which Mosley calls “Plays for Not 
Acting,” include Skylight, Landfall, and Cell, in that order. Mosley intro-
duces each play with a dense theoretical essay. Additionally, the plays 
form a series, with the same actors playing different roles in each and with 
specific themes and portions of dialogue occurring repeatedly through-
out. Following the three plays, Mosley includes a further essay in which 
he elaborates on some of the themes within the related plays. Finally, 
Mosley concludes the volume with a short novel, Cypher, which extends 
the series of plays by telling the stories of the actors’ lives offstage. Given 
the novel’s title, Cypher, one might expect it to offer a map to the mazes 
set up in the plays. But, as Mosley notes, a cipher—to use the American 
English spelling—is something that adds to rather than diminishes com-
plexity: “[a] manner of writing intelligible to those possessing the key . . . 
also . . . the key to such a system.”12 In the context of Catastrophe Practice, 
Cypher works as both: it opens up other texts within the book, but does so 
by extending the very system it helps to access.
Instead of functioning as discrete works within the book, the plays 
act as structures through which actors circulate. Six actors play a total of 
 eighteen roles across the three plays. The list of characters for the first play 
is straightforward: “Ackerman, Helena, Judith, Jason, Ariel, Jenny.”13 
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By the third play, however, the list of characters signals the complex dis-
tributions taking place within Catastrophe Practice:
Anderson who played  Ariel and Bert
Hortense  who played  Judith and the Older Hostess
The Moor   who played  Ackerman and the Barman
Dionysus   who played  Jason and Harry
Florence   who played  Helena and the Char
Siva          who played  Jenny and the Younger Hostess14
Instead of adding stability through triangulation, the tripartite roles 
 complicate the notion of the singular role as such. A given actor does not 
simply play all three roles. Instead, the convoluted dramatis personae sug-
gests that the new character in the third play played the roles contained 
within the former two plays. Dionysus might have been beneath the masks 
that were Jason and Harry, while Ariel and Bert were actually Anderson 
in disguise. The enigmatic cast requires readers to sift through the plays 
in order to figure out what happens and what the relations among the 
ensemble might be. For Mosley’s part, he casts Catastrophe Practice as an 
ensemble text. It both gathers and produces multiplicity.
In the structure of the plays, we find a clue to Mosley’s riddle: the plays 
not only enact the systematic connections; they also constitute the system 
of connections in themselves. Mosley emphasizes his attention to systems, 
networks, and circuits throughout the series, and especially in the essays 
he includes in Catastrophe Practice. In his untitled introduction to the 
third play, Cell, Mosley outlines the strategy of his project:
By the cultivation of a ground for a new style of think-
ing one might find that seeds suited to it that have been 
blown there by chance have become established and have 
grown there because of effort. There are such seeds—how 
else could one have the idea of such a ground? So—Dig for 
Circuitry! for recognition of complexity!15
Mosley’s exhortation to “Dig for Circuitry!” appears to oppose his more 
georgic appeal to cultivate ground for new seeds, but rather than thinking 
of technology and earthly cultivation as oppositional, Mosley understands 
them as forms of complementary layering. The technological metaphor, 
after all, need not overpower the agrarian: we dig for circuitry so that 
seeds blown in by chance might grow.
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In his mixed metaphors for the elaboration of critical thought, we 
find a subtle example of Mosley’s appeal: complementary metaphors 
acknowledge thought’s ability to embrace patterns and complexity, for 
metaphor itself carries thought between analogous ideas or objects.16 
Metaphor transfers thought and is thought. Mosley’s plea to dig for cir-
cuitry expresses a metaphoric understanding of the structures of thought 
itself. Later in the same introduction, Mosley returns to his circuits. This 
time, Mosley echoes strains of Nietzschean thought:
[I]t is by your mistakes that you learn: it is by being free to 
face what is “bad” that you can learn that it suits you to try 
to stick with what is “good”: that is this sort of freedom—
trial and error, circuitry—that is the only way of becoming 
something out of reach of the rules of slavery.17
For Mosley, circuitry couples with trial and error because it retains the 
logic of return and of going back to begin again. In a similar manner, 
Mosley’s book functions as a system of circuits whose repetitive, circu-
itous structure sends the reader on feedback loops of trial and error.
Mosley elaborates on the complementary aspects of his thought and 
his books in his autobiography, Efforts at Truth (1995).18 Reflecting on the 
development of Catastrophe Practice, Mosley recalls that, after writing the 
first two plays,
It seemed that I would have to write a third play to go with 
Skylight and Landfall, so that the actors could form some 
circuit; so that there could be some structure within which, 
from which, whatever new liveliness there might be might 
take root and grow. In the mind, of course, in the mind. 
This third play was to be called Cell—something in which 
you are locked up; also that within and from which new life 
may break out.19
Here, the actors and the plays form a structure “within which, from 
which” liveliness might spring. Liveliness inhabits structure, and feed-
back loops of trial and error within a system enable the dynamic extension 
of the system. The plays test thought by testing the critical complementar-
ity of Mosley’s reiterated coupling: within which, from which. How does 
a critical focus on one aspect of this coupling obscure the other aspect? 
And how does this obscurity—this working in the dark—relate to 
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literary indeterminacy, both aesthetic and material? For Mosley, the pair-
ing shows how playful circuits constitute structure and play, testing both 
while privileging neither. This is the dynamic within which and from 
which Mosley’s complementarity works.
Mosley’s Present Passages
John O’Brien first discovered Nicholas Mosley’s work through his friend, 
Gilbert Sorrentino. Sorrentino, the American novelist and poet, had been 
exchanging letters with O’Brien for nearly three years by the time of his 
February 1974 letter, in which Sorrentino writes,
If you can, get a book (Coward-McCann) called Impossible 
Object [1968] by Nicholas Mosley. It is extraordinary and 
brilliant. You see how everything conspires to keep these 
remarkable writers under wraps. He’s British and has been 
publishing novels for apparently 20 years or so. But read it 
yourself. What a pleasure to see a conscious artist at work.20
O’Brien was equally impressed by Mosley’s work and by the late 1970s 
had undertaken to interview Mosley in a series of letters.
In the interview conducted by O’Brien between 1977 and 1978, just as 
Mosley was completing Catastrophe Practice, Mosley remarks that
what is no longer of interest is “what happens next” but—
what is happening now. . . . (You can make up anything as 
what’s going to happen next: then when it doesn’t, that’s 
tragic!) But “what is happening now” is a true form of 
enquiry.21
To resist the “what happens next” approach to literature, Mosley makes 
Catastrophe Practice into a formal challenge of narrative development. 
Certainly, one can find moments in Mosley’s works where the narrative 
seems to move forward, but Mosley continually impedes such progression 
by looping back or drawing in decontextualized passages. In crafting a 
narrative style that continually loops back on itself and often appears to 
stall completely before finding new directions, Mosley emphasizes pro-
cess over progress. He focuses on the presence of the text, or the present 
text, as the most permeable place, or permeable temporality, for inquiry 
and observation.
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Mosley’s focus on the present is most evident in the formal protocols 
of the “Plays for Not Acting.” Plays, after all, tend to present narrative 
action in the present tense. Mosley taps drama’s narrative form and favors 
narrative description over dialogue throughout the sequence. In this 
fairly typical example of the style of Mosley’s plays, he emphasizes the 
present tense and suggests that one must sift through present information 
in search of signs and signals:
Ackerman turns and looks at Jenny. He acts, somewhat 
clumsily, as if he is pulled each way between Ariel and 
Jenny. Then Ariel falls, heavily, on to his face on the swing 
sofa. The sofa bounces, and becomes still. Jenny stands. She 
turns and looks at Ariel. Ackerman goes to the balustrade 
at the back and looks over.
Ackerman Did you hear it? Some signal. Some sign. 
They’re all around, like wolves.
Jenny comes and kneels by Ariel. Ackerman looks at the 
audience.22
Here, the brevity and simple syntax of Mosley’s sentences stress the presence 
of the passage. Present tenses pile up and most follow directly after the sub-
ject of the sentence: Ackerman turns, he acts, Ariel falls, the sofa bounces, 
and so on. Ackerman looks at Jenny and then looks out at the audience, an 
action Mosley’s characters repeat throughout the three plays. His characters 
busy themselves with the present act of watching, observing, and looking. 
From the almost programmatic presentness of the passage, Ackerman’s snip-
pet of dialogue sifts for information: “Did you hear it? Some signal. Some 
sign.” Within a torrent of present-tense action and movement, Ackerman 
attempts to find a clear signal in what otherwise emerges as the noise of the 
present, thus emulating Mosley’s understanding of the literary encounter.
Mosley again stresses his attention to present observation in the final 
critical essay in Catastrophe Practice. In this passage, Mosley reflects on the 
“Plays for not Acting,” in which characters continually think of them-
selves as actors, purposefully stumble over their lines, and try to act as if 
not acting at all:
In the attempt of an actor to move between what  acting 
is and what it is not—and by doing so to demonstrate 
“truth”—there would have to be something of the 
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self-questioning of Brecht’s Chinese actor who “expresses 
his awareness of being observed . . . observes himself . . . 
will occasionally look at the audience and say ‘Isn’t it just 
like that?’”: a question not of—What will happen next?—
but of—What is happening now?—the former involv-
ing helplessness (though perhaps comfort in helplessness) 
because the answer is unknowable; the latter involving 
pleasure in prospects, because the facts for hypotheses and 
testing are there. There would be a going-round, a sifting, 
a searching . . . to see what in the end, as in a riddle, is left.23
According to Mosley, attentiveness to “what is happening now” in lit-
erature untethers the reader from the helplessness Mosley associates with 
future-oriented thinking. And while one could argue that paying too 
much attention to the present would eliminate critical distance, Mosley 
suggests that attention to the present in literature facilitates self-reflec-
tion and critical distance. As Allen Dunn argues in an introductory essay 
to Mosley’s work, “For Mosley, the act of self-reflection creates a space 
between the observer and the forces that would constrain her. His hope 
is that ‘By being aware of one’s own programming . . . one might also be 
apart from it.’”24 Similarly, Mosley proposes that being attentive to what 
is at hand entails an appreciation of the “pleasure in prospects, because 
the facts for hypotheses and testing are there.” Here, Mosley orients the 
present toward hypothetical potentialities rather than endorsing a view 
of the future as either a prescriptive projection or a tragic impossibil-
ity. Sensing the potentiality of the given, or giving one’s attention to the 
thinking system, establishes a relation between present and future where 
the future is understood to exist in the facts, objects, and patterns at hand. 
Mosley’s emphasis on present time thus connects pattern recognition and 
misrecognition, hypotheses and testing, to the present means of the liter-
ary encounter. Readers of the play observe what is at hand, on the page or 
on the stage. They make of it what they can as they look for some signal 
in the flux of the present.
Whereas the unknowable future places humans in a position of pow-
erlessness and resignation, attention to what is present, according to 
Mosley, enables us to observe ourselves observing and to observe ourselves 
being observed. In his epigraph to Catastrophe Practice, Mosley quotes 
Nietzsche, asking, “What meaning would our whole being possess if it 
were not this—that in us the will to truth becomes conscious of itself as a 
problem.”25 Mosley adopts a version of this idea in his first essay, where he 
outlines his view of self-conscious acting:
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An actor comes on: he is watched: he watches himself being 
watched: those who watch, watch him watching. This is a 
person’s predicament—what is an act, what is not: what is 
“true”, what is “false”: not what will happen next, but what 
is happening now. This is a person’s experience of himself; 
through it, his experience of everything. And being shown 
this, a member of an audience might indeed recognise 
 himself—might even be encouraged to change—being 
presented with an experience of—not acting.26
For Mosley, the power of thought resides not just in the patterns it might 
identify, but in the contemporaneous moment of observation, in the abil-
ity to observe. The result of such observation is not the true or the false 
verdict that leads to action, but the recognition of the partial passivity 
that is itself the act of observing. As Mosley playfully notes, the observer 
might experience himself, might even change, by being presented with an 
experience of not acting. The change Mosley references is not the change 
of future-oriented action; rather, change results from the partially passive, 
partially active act of contemporary observation. Mosley concentrates on 
the present and its contexts so that his book becomes “a going-round, 
a sifting, a searching . . . to see what in the end, as in a riddle, is left.” 
Or, as one of the young protagonists in Hopeful Monsters contemplates, 
“Was it true that if one made one’s mind blank then . . . images might fall 
through?”27
Poring Over, Passing Through
With Catastrophe Practice, Mosley attempts to make his texts legible as 
riddles, as apparatuses (both text and textual object) through which infor-
mation passes and passes away. In his epigraph to Skylight, Mosley invokes 
the link between the verb, to riddle, and the material object from which it 
derives: “a coarse-meshed sieve, used to separate sand from gravel, ashes 
from cinders, etc.”28 Mosley thus draws on the material riddle, the instru-
ment, when he prefaces his first play with the verb form: “Riddle.  .  . . 
to separate chaff from corn, ashes from cinders etc. . . . test (evidence, 
truth).”29 Like a sieve, a riddle separates material. The most provocative 
and useful aspect of “riddle” for our purposes is that riddling both allows 
matter to pass through and blocks matter from passing through. Riddling 
also has literary precedents: Oedipus and the riddle of the Sphinx come 
to mind. Oedipus answers the Sphinx’s riddle and is allowed to pass 
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into Thebes. The riddle is both a puzzle and an apparatus for narrative 
 passage. Following from this, the solution to the riddle is not the point 
of the riddle; rather, the riddle figures the concept of narrative passage 
as such, as information and characters either pass through or fail to. For 
Mosley, the process of riddling, sifting, and searching constitutes the liter-
ary encounter.
By fashioning his book as an apparatus through which material 
pours, Mosley asks the reader to continue poring over the text. I use this 
 expression—to pore over a text—quite deliberately here precisely because 
Mosley conceptualizes Catastrophe Practice as a riddle. Even if the Oxford 
English Dictionary offers no etymological evidence to suggest that the verb 
pore is related either to porousness or to pouring, as in water through a 
sieve, we still profit by considering such homophonic layering in relation 
to Mosley’s work. Midway through the play for which riddle serves as 
an epigraph, one of the central figures looks out into the audience in a 
moment of Brechtian alienation:
Jason looks at the audience. Then he puts out his hand 
against the vertical plane above the footlights as if he were 
feeling there a glass partition or a screen.
Jason Shake it—
Judith Like a cage—
Jason A sieve—
Judith A riddle—
Jason A heartbeat.30
While Mosley’s descriptive directions suggest that the vertical partition is 
either a glass or a screen, Jason and Judith’s exchange makes it clear that 
the partition is a screen. They want to shake the divider in order to make 
the cage a sieve. Just as Jason and Judith turn a moment of observation—
of looking through the screen—into a moment of sifting, so, too, Mosley 
emphasizes the sievelike operations of the text through which thought is 
channeled.
The endless riddling in Catastrophe Practice expresses Mosley’s prop-
osition that the ends of literary production are critically indeterminate. 
This is not to say that literature has no effects, but that its effects cannot 
be determined in advance. In a scene from Skylight, Jason speaks to one 
of the other five major characters in the play, an older gentleman named 
Ackerman, and wonders what aspects of the play might get through to 
the audience:
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Ackerman and Jason wait. They watch the audience.
Ackerman  One or two—
Jason  Get through.31
One or two get through. As simple as the phrase sounds, it appears in vari-
ous contexts throughout Catastrophe Practice and serves as Mosley’s critical 
refrain. Like many other expressions in the book, “one or two get through” 
surfaces from the chaff of its contexts. At times, it makes perfect sense in the 
play’s dialogue. At other times, the phrase appears out of place, impeding 
rather than easing the passage of narrative. Implying passage and blockage, 
the phrase condenses Mosley’s contention that texts, like textual objects, can-
not determine their ends but rather function as the machinery for sifting.
The phrase “one or two get through” becomes central to Mosley’s body 
of work because it asserts that an encounter with literature—a text, a play, 
an essay—produces something, but what it produces is contingent on the 
kind of questions one asks. Moreover, the thought it produces necessar-
ily obscures other thought. Here, we find Mosley’s theory of literary com-
plementarity at work. Mosley adopts this line of thought from quantum 
theory, particularly from Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and 
Niels Bohr’s principle of complementarity. Bohr developed his principle 
of complementarity through his “double-slit experiment” in which he 
attempted to determine how particles could act both like waves and par-
ticles simultaneously.32 By performing his experiment in which projected 
particles would pass through one of two slits in a screen before collecting on 
a detector, Bohr came to a conclusion he eventually called complementarity. 
David Kaiser gives a useful summary of Bohr’s more difficult explanation:
To Bohr, the paradox of the slit detector exemplified a more 
general feature of quantum mechanics. Ask a  “particle-like” 
question—“through which slit did the particle pass?”—
and you will always receive a particle-like answer (“slit A” 
or “slit B”). Ask a “wave-like” question—“how does [the 
wavefunction] behave in the region between the slits and 
the detectors?”—and you will always receive a wavelike 
response. . . . Bohr coined the term “complementarity” for 
his emerging philosophy.33
At around the same time Bohr developed his theory of  complementarity, 
Werner Heisenberg established his uncertainty principle, in which he 
argues that
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certain pairs of quantities, such as position and momentum 
or energy and time, could never be specified with unlimited 
precision at a single instant. The more precisely a quantum 
object’s position was specified, the less precisely its momen-
tum could be, and vice versa. According to Heisenberg, in 
other words, we can never know exactly where an object is 
and where it is going at the same time.34
Mosley’s “one or two,” which echoes the language of Bohr’s slit-screen 
experiments, indicates the complementarity and uncertainty at play in 
literary experimentation. Mosley’s theory of literary complementarity 
asks how literary processes feed into thought and its contingencies, for 
the phrase itself, “one or two,” is both singular and multiple. The result 
depends on the approach. One cannot determine which one or two get 
through, or the ultimate direction of those that get through, because the 
answer emerges from the critical encounter between the observer and 
the apparatus. In this case, the Catastrophe Practice series functions as the 
apparatus.
Mosley strengthens his identification with quantum theory in a 
Hopeful Monsters scene in which Max Ackerman, one of the two pro-
tagonists in the book and one of several protagonists in the series, 
watches a group of children pushing tires up a hill. One child is much 
smaller than the others, causing Ackerman to comment on the child’s 
Sisyphean task. Ackerman then reconsiders: “Or this is like one of those 
experiments in which you bombard with particles a small aperture in a 
screen and it is according either to chance or to how you have set up the 
experiment what, if anything, gets through.”35 Here, Mosley fairly accu-
rately describes the fundamental question at the core of Bohr’s comple-
mentarity: How do the parameters of the experiment affect the results? 
And how do contingency and indeterminacy inhabit a functioning 
apparatus? As Mosley answers, what gets through does so according to 
chance or to how one sets up the experiment. Mosley’s work plays on 
the  tension between chance and structure, between random occurrence 
and occurrence influenced by the apparatus itself. He cannot choose 
one over the other. Rather, like Bohr proposes, chance and apparatus 
function in terms of complementarity. If one looks at a specific element 
of the literary experiment, something continues to happen elsewhere, 
offstage, in secret.36 Darkness and chance are, oddly, the unknowable 
parts of the experiment itself as well as its potentiality. For Mosley, 
experiments produce their own unknowns. Focusing on one aspect of 
an experiment obscures another aspect, and so complementarity figures 
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as the endlessly productive potentiality of literature itself, both in the 
aesthetic economy of the text and in the processes of literary production.
Mosley’s Book to Come
In an essay collected in his volume Does Writing Have a Future? (2011), 
Vilém Flusser characterizes a publisher as a “grid in the stream of texts 
whose duty is to block most texts from getting into print. The vast swell 
of printed texts in which we currently swim is just the tip of an iceberg of 
texts that did not succeed in passing through the grid.”37 Here, Flusser’s 
publishing industry mirrors Mosley’s sievelike book. When Mosley 
models his book as a riddle, he invokes not only the recursive strategies 
within his circuitous texts. Like Flusser, he reminds us that the book also 
moves through material literary circuits as a means of testing thought. 
One acquires a sense of the contours of the grid by observing what passes 
through it and what does not. In short, structures within the literary field 
complement Mosley’s theory of literature, merging Mosley’s riddling 
books with the processes of literary circulation.
The argument that scholars can approach a book through its mate-
rial history is very much indebted to the discipline of book history. As 
Peter McDonald has pointed out, however, book historians tend to sit-
uate book history as the empirical antidote to the fervently theoretical 
and “ahistorical” atmosphere of literary studies in the 1980s and 1990s.38 
McDonald revisits the separation between book history and literary the-
ory, describing it as the unfortunate result of a struggle for academic 
literary hegemony.39 Now that the heady antagonism between book his-
tory and literary theory—particularly post-structuralism—has abated, 
McDonald proposes that revisiting the correspondences between the 
two will help scholars to navigate the Scylla and Charybdis found at the 
heart of literary scholarship. Post-structuralist theory will earn its revival 
through nuanced materialist and structuralist approaches, and the too 
staid field of book history will be reanimated by the specter of Jacques 
Derrida.
McDonald makes his argument by shuttling between two extremes. 
On the one hand, post-structuralist theory is charged with an overzeal-
ous approach to literary antiessentialism. In what McDonald calls an 
enchanted antiessentialist argument, one cannot claim “great literature,” 
because “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte,” a phrase Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
translates as “There is nothing outside the text,” and Derek Attridge 
translates as “There is no outside-the-text.”40 On the other hand, book 
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history’s empirical rigor in describing every last detail of a material text, 
which Johanna Drucker dubs “thelanguageofthickdescription,”41 pays too 
little attention to the text as opposed to the textual object. McDonald calls 
this second group the “skeptical antiessentialists.”42 McDonald attempts 
to unite the skeptical and enchanted antiessentialists by pointing out that 
Derrida’s “hors-texte” is actually a pun, which sets “hors-texte, a technical 
bookmaking term roughly translated as ‘plate’ (as in ‘This book contains 
five color plates’), alongside hors texte, which Attridge’s translation comes 
closest to capturing.”43 Here, McDonald challenges what some have come 
to understand as the ahistorical tendencies of post-structuralist theory, 
especially as those tendencies have found their call to arms in Derrida’s 
expression. For, as McDonald points out, Derrida’s famed phrase concen-
trates on the encounter between a text and its production, an idea Derrida 
will return to throughout his career, especially in a work such as Archive 
Fever (1995).44
McDonald’s argument suggests that Derrida’s famous phrase is less 
an abrupt break with history than a significant consideration of the com-
plementary aspects of material and textual impression. Like Flusser and 
Mosley, Derrida asserts that material processes impress themselves upon 
a text. And like Flusser and Mosley, he understands that the text also 
impresses itself upon those processes as it tests the structure of the literary 
field. Flusser elaborates most clearly on the mutual impressions between 
a text and its publisher, suggesting that the grid of the publishing field is 
formed by the texts that pass through it:
At the moment, publishers are still sufficiently elastic to 
adjust themselves to suit some of the texts. . . . This dia-
logue between texts and publisher may sometimes change 
the publishing criteria, but it also changes texts. That is, 
after all, the essence of dialogue: the participant becomes 
the other of the other, himself changing by changing 
another. A printed text is not only one that has changed 
(moved, impressed) the publisher, but also one that has 
been changed (moved, impressed) by the publisher.45
Similar to Mosley and Derrida, Flusser locates mutual impression in the 
text’s movement through the literary field. The text can change the field 
and be changed by it. The text, in this account, is both active and pas-
sive. For Mosley and his theoretical interlocutors, mutual impression 
between literary practices and literary texts makes literature endlessly 
productive.
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McDonald, for example, admires Pierre Bourdieu’s outline of the liter-
ary field, which Bourdieu conceives of as the wide array of institutions and 
apparatuses that makes literary production possible. Yet McDonald also 
contends that Bourdieu’s conception of the literary field is too restricted. 
As he clarifies,
Bourdieu’s skeptical antiessentialism remains limited 
 insofar as it addresses only one side of literature’s double 
challenge. By privileging the historically specific norms 
and categories of the field, without which literature as such 
could not exist, it underestimates the unpredictability of 
writing, which is always capable of transforming the field 
by exceeding or subverting its determinations.46
For McDonald, Bourdieu errs on the side of description and, in doing so, 
fails to acknowledge the unpredictability inscribed in the text itself. With 
this essay, I offer Mosley as a figure whose work demonstrates the process 
of thinking through literature’s double challenge: the desire for material 
and historical specificity and the acknowledgment of the indeterminate 
text. Mosley’s work responds to writing’s ability to bypass determined posi-
tions, but it also remains cognizant that writing’s power is channeled and 
changed through the circuits of its material dissemination. What McDonald 
ultimately refers to as “literature’s testing doubleness” and the “inescapable 
uncertainty of literature’s fortunes” might be the testing doubleness of lit-
erary complementarity expressed by Mosley’s “one or two.” These one or 
two express the uncertain ends of texts and textual objects alike.
Mosley marvels at the book’s circulation in the world, finding its tor-
tuous paths similar to those he develops in Catastrophe Practice. In par-
ticular, Mosley wonders at the distant readers to whom his books find 
their way. In his autobiography, Mosley describes his difficulty in finding 
a publisher after completing Catastrophe Practice. Two of Mosley’s former 
publishers had already rejected the book before Mosley’s friend at Secker 
and Warburg accepted the book for publication. Just after Mosley talks 
about the process of finding a publisher, he takes the time to mention the 
followers his work has been acquiring:
There were in fact a few other people at this time popping 
up in odd corners of the world who were showing an inter-
est in what I was doing: this was an encouragement which 
counter-balanced the lack of interest in Catastrophe Practice 
at home. There were John Banks, a philosopher in Canada; 
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John O’Brien, an editor and later publisher in America; 
Richard Murphet, a stage-producer in Australia. By what 
strange channels—underground or blown over the sea—
had such seeds as I had cast out travelled!47
Likening his works to seeds on the wind, Mosley compares the physical 
dispersal of his books across space to the “seeds,” or ideas, Mosley finds 
circulating in his books. Like his ideas, his books are cast out and find 
their way to odd corners of the world. This is to say that his texts find 
their meaning, at least in part, through the strange channels that comprise 
the literary field.
Mosley’s perception of literary endeavor emerges most clearly in his 
use of the term “practice,” which he uses in an attempt to reconcile two 
conflicting notions in his thought. First, Mosley suggests that literature 
cannot determine its effects; one or two ideas get through, but the text 
cannot determine which. Second, Mosley maintains that literature has 
actual effects in the world, that it affects the way people think and live. 
Literature might even create nonprescriptive possibilities for change. To 
put this in Mosley’s terms, seeds cannot simply blow around forever. If 
the conditions are right, some take root and grow. The impetus driv-
ing Mosley’s writing thus originates in that long-standing question, 
McDonald’s double challenge: Can literature claim detachment and 
still have effects? Mosley’s answer comes in the form of practice. To 
encounter literature is to practice thought without knowing its effects. 
For Mosley, to practice thought without knowing the results in advance 
should not lead to resignation or helplessness, because one or two ideas 
get through. To put this differently, to practice occasionally becomes a 
practice. The proliferation of texts imprints, and bears the imprint of, 
literary practices. With Catastrophe Practice, Mosley turns his attention 
to the processes of practicing, riddling, poring over the text, and pouring 
through it. In doing so, he shows us how practicing becomes a practice 
in the multiple instantiations of Catastrophe Practice. In a way, the book 
bears witness to its own effects in the form of revisions, editions, and 
copyright dates, among other “bibliographical codes.”48 The book is mul-
tiple in that it collects diverse texts and genres, but also because it exists in 
multiple configurations.
In The Book to Come (French 1959; English 2003), Maurice Blanchot 
offers a critical reading of Stéphane Mallarmé’s Un coup de dés (1897), 
in English, A Throw of the Dice. In one of the final passages of the 
essay, Blanchot remarks upon Mallarmé’s triumphant last line in which 
Mallarmé writes that “All Thought emits a Throw of Dice”:
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That is the closure and the opening, the invisible passage 
where movement in the form of a sphere is end and begin-
ning without end. Everything is finished and everything 
begins again. The Book is thus, subtly, affirmed in the 
becoming that is perhaps its meaning, a meaning that might 
be the very becoming of the circle. The end of the work 
is its origin, its new and old beginning: it is its possibility 
opened one more time.49
Blanchot proposes that the unknown future of the book to come opens 
the book to its own becoming. The throw of the dice that is both the clo-
sure of and the opening in the literary work is incorporated in Catastrophe 
Practice, which opens and closes a series and a circuit. Following from 
this, the circularity of Mosley’s form and his revision of the initial book in 
the series affirm the becoming that is the book’s meaning. The book finds 
its meaning by way of literary circulation because circulation both closes 
and opens the book to the world. Circulation specifies the book, but cannot 
specify its ends.
Mosley offers a useful reconsideration of The Book to Come by 
reflecting on the book in relation to literary practices. In his May 1988 
letter to John O’Brien, Mosley delights in the fact that Dalkey Archive 
Press will publish the revised version of Catastrophe Practice: “It means 
a great deal to me that there will be an authentic version of Catastrophe 
Practice in existence. I would have had to gone back to it anyway, after 
the end of the four novels, and it is marvelous that I have this chance 
for the fed-back circuit to be in existence.”50 The fedback circuit, of 
course, is formed by literary practices. While Mosley would certainly 
subscribe to Blanchot’s idea that the book is that which is its own 
becoming, a notion Mosley develops throughout Catastrophe Practice, 
he revises Blanchot’s thought by suggesting that literary practices are 
complementary to the becoming of the book, an idea Blanchot leaves 
absent from his work.
Mosley’s autobiographical reflection on the initial publication of 
Hopeful Monsters offers one last path with which to approach Mosley’s 
work and its relation to literary practices. “When I had finished Hopeful 
Monsters,” Mosley writes,
it was an enormous book—the sort of book that sends pub-
lishers’ hearts into their boots. But how otherwise could the 
novel itself be a hopeful monster? It seemed for a time that 
it might get lost down a coal-hole. Then suddenly—oh yes 
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there were coincidences all right! A copy flipping here and 
there and landing on this or that desk—And there it was, 
winding its way like some great whale over rooftops.51
A great whale winding its way over rooftops? This is a strange channel 
indeed. But, more than that, the description calls forth the image of a 
massive body, the enormous book, finding its way into being and leaving 
a marvelous mess in its tracks. In this image, we find an encapsulation 
of Mosley’s own body of work: it plays on the complementarity between 
a book and its becoming and, just as significantly, between the idea of 
 literature and its practice.
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